Whistleblowing Protection and Concurrent ‘Worker’ Status for a Junior Doctor:Day v Health Education England by Ashton, Jeanette
Title: Whistleblowing protection and concurrent ‘worker’ status for a junior doctor: Day v 
Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust also known as Day v Health Education England   
 
Jeanette Ashton 
 
Subject: Employment 
 
Key words: Whistleblowing; protected disclosure; detriment; worker; Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998; Employment Rights Act 1996 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Day v Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust also known as Day v Health Education 
England1 (Day) the Court of Appeal (the CA) had the opportunity to consider whether the 
relationship between a junior doctor and Health Education England, the organisation 
responsible for organising training and posts for post-graduate trainee doctors, came within 
the protection from detriment for whistleblowers under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998 (PIDA).  From a socio-political perspective this case is of particular significance, set 
against a backdrop of the Francis Report into the catastrophic failings of the Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust2 and the recognition in that report of the necessity of a cultural shift 
at organisational level to ensure that NHS workers feel able to raise concerns without fear of 
detriment.  The potential compromising of whistleblowing protection in working 
relationships falling outside the primary working relationship if the Employment Tribunal 
and Employment Appeal Tribunal ruling had been upheld, led to Public Concern at Work 
joining the proceedings as an interested party.3 From a legal perspective, it is Lord Justice 
Elias’ reasoning on the statutory interpretation of the relevant legislative provisions which is 
noteworthy and likely to prove useful in the future development of the law.  By allowing the 
appeal and holding that Dr Day’s relationship with HEE could come within the scope of the 
extended definition of worker in s43K(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act (ERA), it is 
suggested that this judgment provides the right framework for future analysis of the ‘worker’ 
‘employer’ relationship. 
 
2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND4 
 
Following his application to train in emergency medicine Dr Day entered into a training 
contract with the London Deanery which later became the South London Health Education 
Board (the Board), part of Health Education England (HEE), which is responsible for 
organising training programmes and posts for post-graduate trainee doctors.  Dr Day was 
placed with Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust (the Trust) where he worked under a 
contract of employment as a specialist registrar in Acute Care Common Stem Emergency 
Medicine.  During his time at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital Dr Day raised concerns that 
serious under-staffing levels were compromising patient safety.  As well as raising these 
concerns with the Trust, he also claimed to have raised them at training progress meetings 
with the Board, alleging that these were protected disclosures within the scope of 
whistleblowing legislation and that as a result he was subjected to a number of significant 
detriments by HEE.  Dr Day brought proceedings before the Employment Tribunal (ET) 
against the Trust and HEE.5  HEE denied Dr Day’s claims that he had suffered detriment as 
the result of making protected disclosures and asserted that even if his claims were valid, his 
relationship with HEE did not fall within the statutory worker/employer relationship as set 
out in the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) extended definition of worker in s43K.  The 
issue was considered at a preliminary hearing which, Elias LJ noted, was unfortunately to 
deal with HEE’s strike-out application on an agreed set of limited facts, which argued that the 
claim against it had no reasonable prospect of success, instead of being determined after a full 
fact-finding exercise.  HEE was successful in the ET having Day’s claims struck out and 
Day’s appeal to the EAT was unsuccessful.   
 
 
3. THE LEGISLATION 
 
It is worth reminding ourselves at this point that the whistleblowing provisions provide a 
framework for disclosure in the workplace and entitlement to claim compensation on 
suffering detriment as a result of having made a ‘protected disclosure’ as per s43B(1) of the 
ERA.6   S47B states: 
 
1. A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act or any deliberate failure to act, 
by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure. 
 
 
Therefore, as Mr Justice Langstaff set out in the EAT judgment, a Claimant must show that 
he is a ‘worker’ within the meaning of Part IVA of the ERA and that the alleged act has been 
carried out by his ‘employer’.7  Section 230(3) defines ‘worker’ as: 
 
an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked 
under) – (a) a contract of employment or (b) any other contract whether express or implied and (if it is 
expressed) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally 
any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that 
of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual 
 
But the key issue in this appeal centred around the extended definition of worker set out in 
s43K(1)(a), reproduced below, in particular the meaning of the introductory words of that 
provision and of the phrase ‘substantially determined’ that appears further down:  
 
For the purposes of this Part “worker” includes an individual who is not a worker as defined by section 
230(3) but who- 
 
(a) works or worked for a person in circumstances in which- 
(i) he is or was introduced or supplied to do that work by a third person, and 
(ii) the terms on which he is or was engaged to do the work are or were in practice substantially 
determined not by him but by the person for whom he works or worked, by the third person or 
by both of them… 
 
And any reference to a worker’s contract, to employment or to a worker being employed shall be 
construed accordingly. 
 
In conjunction with the s43K(1)(a) extended worker definition, an employer is defined as ‘the 
person who substantially determines or determined the terms on which he is or was 
engaged’..8 
 
Judge Hyde in the ET held that the Dr Day’s relationship with HEE ran alongside his 
contractual relationship with the relevant NHS trusts and that although HEE did organise his 
training, it did not substantially determine the terms of his work.  Langstaff J in the EAT 
found that the ET was entitled to find as it had, agreeing that whilst HEE decided where Dr 
Day worked, reviewed his training and supplied a significant proportion of his salary, it did 
not follow that this meant HEE had determined his terms.  Furthermore, even if it had, this 
was certainly not ‘substantially’, which must be interpreted as ‘in large part’ rather than as Dr 
Day contended ‘more than trivially’.9   
 
 
GROUNDS OF APPEAL 
 
The questions for this appeal to address centred around statutory interpretation, namely 
whether Dr Day was a worker and HEE his employer within the legislation.  More 
specifically, the issue was whether Dr Day’s commonly agreed status as a s230(3) worker 
with the Trust precluded him from having a s43K(1) extended definition worker status with 
HEE.  The conclusion of the EAT was that because Dr Day had s230(3) status with the Trust, 
he could not have s43K(1) status with HEE.   Important here is that although Dr Day was not 
without whistleblowing protection, this was, in PCAW’s words ‘cold comfort’ given that the 
bulk of the detrimental treatment alleged was from HEE rather than the Trust.10  Had this 
finding of the EAT been upheld by the CA it is likely that an unwelcome consequence could 
have been that junior doctors would be deterred from making disclosures in respect of key 
organisations outside of the primary employment relationship such as HEE. 
 
Counsel for Dr Day submitted that the ET had wrongly analysed the question it had to 
determine.  In focussing on whether the Trust or HEE had played the primary role in 
determining Dr Day’s terms of engagement, it had failed to recognise that both may have 
done so.11   
 
THE COURT OF APPEAL’S FINDINGS 
 
A. Is it possible to have concurrent s230(3) and s43K(1) worker status? 
 
Langstaff J’s ruling in the EAT was that it was not.  Agreeing with HEE’s argument that 
where a person came within the s230(3) definition, which the Claimant did in respect of his 
employment with Lewisham, the s43K extensions could not apply, he stated: 
 
If  the section had been intended to add a category of employer against whom a person might act in 
addition to others who were his employer, there would be no need for the words “who is not a worker 
as defined by s230(3)”.  They were intended to have a meaning.12 
 
Of particular interest in the EAT judgment is that Langstaff J addressed the issue of 
purposive statutory interpretation head on, stating that his acceptance of HEE’s submissions 
‘does no violence to the principle of purposive construction’13 because the purpose of the 
s43K extension is to extend the category of ‘worker’ to a ‘limited category of other 
relationships’.14  This he explained, in line with HEE’s submissions, was demonstrated by the 
health service relationships set out in the statute: 
[T]he omission of specific reference to the relationship of a doctor with HEE (or to the deaneries which 
preceded HEE) therefore is strongly suggestive that Parliament deliberately did not intend to include 
it.15   
Consequently, as the detriment alleged was in respect of his relationship with HEE rather 
than his role with the Trust, ‘the position of HEE was little different from any third party who 
might have acted detrimentally towards him as a whistleblower.’16   
Drawing on Elias LJ’s comments in Fecitt & Others v NHS Manchester (Fecitt)17 as to the 
“legitimate role of the Court in construing legislation” Langstaff J made the following 
comment on the limitations of the purposive approach: 
I accept that a purposive approach should be taken to interpreting the public interest disclosure 
provisions in the Employment Rights Act.  But I also accept that this does not mean that a Court is 
entitled to ignore the words of the legislation by thinking that the purpose would better be served if 
they did not appear.18 
The Fecitt decision was reversed by Parliament by s19 of the ERRA, which introduced 
additional protection from detriment by a co-worker as well as employer, giving 
whistleblowing provisions consistency with discrimination protection more generally, with 
the same ‘reasonable steps’ defence available.  However, whilst one view of Fecitt is that it 
highlighted a loophole in protection which Parliament ultimately closed, Langstaff J did not 
share that view: 
Forensically attractive though it may be to describe an absence of protection in particular 
circumstances as a “lacuna” it is better viewed in this case, as it was in Fecitt, as Parliament carefully 
delineating the extent to which protection against detriment for whistle blowing should be afforded.19 
Whilst agreeing with Langstaff J as to the need for a purposive approach to whistleblowing 
legislation, Elias LJ disagreed with his conclusion on the mutual exclusivity of s230(3) and 
s43K(1) worker status, giving a succinct example: 
 
Take an agency worker who has a second job serving in a restaurant in the evenings.  The fact that she 
is a section 230 worker in an unrelated position could not sensibly preclude her from seeking to rely 
upon the extended definition of worker with respect to the agency work.20 
 
Elias LJ drew on Simler J’s approach in McTigue v University Hospital Bristol NHS Trust21 
rejecting the EAT’s conclusion in the Day appeal, which she argued would lead to 
unsatisfactory outcomes if correct.  Simler J submitted that the correct interpretation of the 
introductory words to s43K(1) ‘mean that the provision is only engaged where an individual 
is not a worker within s230(3) in relation to the respondent in question’[my emphasis].22  
This interpretation meant that although Ms McTigue, an agency nurse, had s230(3) worker 
status in respect of her relationship with her agency, this did not preclude her from having 
extended meaning s43K(1) worker status with the University Hospital Bristol NHS Trust, 
against whom she had brought a claim of detriment having made protected disclosures.  
Accepting the submissions of Counsel for Dr Day and Counsel for PCAW, Elias LJ held that 
the words ‘as against a given respondent’ should be inserted into s43K so that it reads: 
 
For the purposes of this Part “worker” includes an individual who as against a given respondent is not 
a worker as defined by section s230(3)23 
 
resulting in the possibility of concurrent s230(3) and s43K(1) worker status with different 
employers.  Addressing the issue of purposive construction, Elias LJ agreed with Langstaff J 
that there are limits to this but found those constraints not to be overreached through his 
interpretation in this case: 
 
A court cannot simply ignore the language of a statute to achieve what it conceives to be a desirable 
policy objective.  But where, as here, some words need to be read into the provision because a literal 
construction cannot be what Parliament intended, then in my view the court should read in such words 
as maximise the protection whilst remaining true to the language of the statute24.   
 
Arguably, the key flaw in the EAT judgment was the result that a worker could have 
whistleblowing protection in an employment relationship where no detriment has taken place 
but no protection in a relationship where it does.  It is still however necessary to satisfy the 
‘substantially determines’ requirement of s43K(2)(a) and this is discussed below. 
 
B. Can more than one body ‘substantially determine’ the terms of a worker’s 
engagement? 
 
As noted above, Langstaff J in the EAT, found that Hyde J in the ET hearing was entitled to 
find that that although HEE organised Dr Day’s training, it did not substantially determine 
the terms of his work.  Elias LJ agreed with Counsel for Dr Day’s submission that the ET had 
applied an incorrect test; namely by considering which of HEE and the Trust had played a 
greater role in setting Dr Day’s terms of engagement, it did not reflect on whether there was a 
possibility that both HEE and the Trust could substantially determine those terms.25  Noting 
that it was not in dispute that the Trust ‘played a more significant role than HEE’, this did not 
mean that HEE could not also ‘substantially determine’ Dr Day’s terms.  Elias LJ did not 
however accept the submission that this approach would have necessarily led to the ET 
finding in Dr Day’s favour, instead remitting the case to a fresh tribunal to decide as a finding 
of fact whether HEE satisfied the substantially determined requirement. 
 
C. Can a tribunal consider factors affecting terms of engagement which are not 
contractual in nature? 
 
A final issue which Elias LJ addressed, whilst noting that it was perhaps a side issue to the 
case in question, was whether a tribunal could only consider contractual terms or whether it 
was permitted to take factors outside contractual terms into account.  Following Sharpe v 
Bishop of Worcester26, where the CA held that for the s43K extended definition of worker to 
apply, there had to be a contractual relationship, the argument can be made that the ‘terms’ to 
be substantially determined per s43K(2)(a) must therefore be contractual.  Recognising that 
this is unlikely to have any ‘material impact’ on the analysis of the fresh ET hearing of Dr 
Day’s claim, Elias LJ provided guidance which may well prove useful for future cases.  
Acknowledging that the terms of engagement are likely to be ‘overwhelmingly contractual’, 
he proceeded again with a purposive approach, stating: 
 
I do not think that Parliament will have envisaged fine arguments on whether a term is contractual or 
not before it can be taken into account.’27   
 
It is however likely that the following statement will feature in future cases where the issue of 
who substantially determines a worker’s terms of engagement needs to be determined: 
 
…a tribunal should make the assessment on a relatively broad brush basis having regard to all the 
factors bearing upon the terms on which the worker was engaged to do the work.28 
 
It is suggested that whilst a ‘relatively broad brush basis’ may well be helpful in terms of 
overall approach, more specific guidance may prove necessary on this point.   
 
CONCLUSION AND WIDER IMPLICATIONS 
 
Following this decision PCAW made the following statement: 
 
The judgment makes crystal clear that action against a whistleblower can sometimes take place by 
those outside the primary employment relationship and that outside bodies can have a huge influence 
over the terms of any worker’s employment.  This goes beyond the specific terms of the employment 
contract.29 
 
Whilst in the initial appeal Counsel for Dr Day had submitted that his arguments for a 
purposive interpretation of the s43K provisions were underpinned by the Article 10 European 
Convention of Human Rights right to Freedom of Expression, interestingly this discussion 
was superfluous to this appeal.30 Langstaff J in the EAT and Elias LJ in the CA were in 
agreement as to the need for a purposive approach, the issue to be resolved was what that 
actually meant in the context of the s230(3) and s43K(1) definition of ‘worker’.  It appears 
that this decision, in removing the unsatisfactory situation where Dr Day would have had 
whistleblowing protection but not from the organisation against which he claimed detrimental 
treatment, has put whistleblowing protection back on the right track.  Although more 
guidance for the lower tribunals may, as suggested above, prove necessary on the 
‘substantially determines’ point, by focussing on the wider context rather than ‘fine 
arguments’, this decision is welcome.  Beyond the scope of this note, much work needs to be 
done at organisational level to ensure that raising concerns is seen as a positive contribution 
to governance.  It is suggested that this decision, unlike the EAT ruling, at the very least does 
not impede that process. 
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